
Deterring International Terrorism And Rogue States Us National Security Policy After 911 Contemporary Security Studies

Global Security and the War on Terror
Strategy in an Era of Complexity
The US Wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan
Global Biosecurity
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US Counter-terrorism Strategy and Al-Qaeda
A Model for Strategic Deterrence
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The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Second Edition
Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence
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Nuclear Weapons and Strategy
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Global Security and the War on Terror University of Pennsylvania Press
Nuclear weapons, once thought to have been marginalized by the end of the Cold War, have returned with a vengeance to the centre of US security concerns and to a world bereft of the old certainties of deterrence. This is a major analysis of these new strategic realities. The George W. Bush administration, having deposed the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, now points to a new nuclear "Axis of Evil": Iran and North Korea. These nations and other rogue states, as well as terrorists, may pose key threats because they are "beyond deterrence", which was based on the credible fear of retaliation after attack. This new study places these and other developments, such as the clear potential for a new nuclear arms race in Asia, within the context of evolving US security policy. Detailing the important milestones in the development of US nuclear strategy and considering the present and future security dilemmas related to nuclear weapons this is a major new contribution to our understanding of the present international climate and the future. Individual chapters are devoted to the key issues of missile defenses, nuclear proliferation and Israel's nuclear deterrent. This book will be of great

interest to all students and scholars of strategic studies, international relations and US foreign policy.

Strategy in an Era of Complexity

University of Chicago Press

Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States US National Security Policy after 9/11 Routledge

The US Wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan GRIN Verlag

This new study challenges the widely held view that many current US adversaries cannot be deterred, maintaining that deterrence is not a relic of the Cold War period and that it should shape US policies toward so-called 'rogue states' and terror groups. James Lebovic argues that deterrence principles continue to apply, and focuses upon the 'three pillars' of the Bush administration's national security policy: missile defence, which preoccupied the administration until September 11, 2001 pre-emption, which became the US focus with the September 11 attacks and US success in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan homeland security, which the administration has portrayed as more a natural response to threat than an aspect of policy that must be reconciled with the other pillars. *Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States* asserts that bad offences and defences have been endemic to the current US policy approach, leading US policy makers to pursue policies that require them to do everything without adequate concern for resource trade-offs, overreach, and unintended consequences. This book will be of great interest to students of US foreign policy,

national and international security, terrorism and international relations in general.

Global Biosecurity Routledge

Once the foundations of U.S. national security strategy, deterrence, containment and collective security must all be adapted to new threats if they are to remain relevant in the 21st century. Deterrence has enjoyed a revival since 9/11, but while useful against asymmetric threats, it comes with inherent risks. Though the U.S. briefly embraced pre-emption in the past decade, containment has once again become an attractive, if complex, option for a frugal and war-weary superpower. And America's collective security arrangements with its allies must be extended to include cyberattacks, but the very nature of cyberwar makes implementation of collective cyberdefense problematic.

Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East Princeton University Press

As a concept, deterrence has launched a thousand books and articles. It has dominated Western strategic thinking for more than four decades. In this important and groundbreaking new book, Lawrence Freedman develops a distinctive approach to the evaluation of deterrence as both a state of mind and a strategic option. This approach is applied to post-cold war crisis management, and the utility and relevance of the concept is addressed in relation to US strategic practice post-9/11, particularly in the light of the apparent preference of the Bush Administration for the alternative concept of pre-emption. The study of deterrence has been hampered by the weight of the intellectual baggage accumulated since the end of the Second World War. Exaggerated notions

of what deterrence might achieve were developed, only to be knocked down by academic critique. In this book, Freedman charts the evolution of the contemporary concept of deterrence, and discusses whether - and how - it still has relevance in today's world. He considers constructivist as well as realist approaches and draws on criminological as well as strategic studies literature to develop a concept of a norms-based, as opposed to an interest-based, deterrence. This book will be essential reading for students of politics and international relations as well as all those interested in contemporary strategic thought.

US Counter-terrorism Strategy and Al-Qaeda Routledge

Dramatic changes in the international system since the early nineties, namely the end of the Cold War and the post-9/11 ascendancy of the Bush Doctrine, have left many to wonder whether Cold War era influence strategies such as deterrence, compellence, and engagement are viable against new U.S. threats rogue states. This thesis will examine U.S. efforts between 1986 and 2004 to convince Libya to cease its support for international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). U.S. influence strategy towards Libya was a short term failure and a long term success. The compellence and deterrence policies established by President Reagan and strengthened by later administrations served to isolate Libya economically and diplomatically and set the conditions for successful conditional engagement. Positive behavior change by Libya began first with the Clinton Administration's introduction of conditional engagement. The Bush Administration, benefiting from years of Libyan isolation and the positive

response to conditional engagement, continued to engage Libya in an incremental fashion. Libya renounced its terrorist ties in August 2003 and weapons of mass destruction in December 2003. Since then Tripoli has taken actionable steps to verify this change of policy and both governments are currently on course for reconciliation. *A Model for Strategic Deterrence*
Routledge

This book examines the question of how to deter a non-state terrorist actor. Can terrorism be deterred? This book argues that current research is unable to find strong cases of deterrence success, because it uses a flawed research design which does not capture the longitudinal dynamics of the process. So far, the focus of inquiry has been on the tactical elements of a state's counterterrorism strategy, instead of the non-state actor's grand strategies. By studying the campaigns of Hezbollah, the Palestinians, the Irish Republican Army, Chechens, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and Al-Qaeda/Taliban and ISIS over time, we can see that deterrence strategies that target the cost-benefit calculus of terrorist organizations lead to wars of attrition – which is the non-state organization's strategy for victory. To escape the attrition trap, the state must undermine the attrition strategy of terrorist organizations by using offensive campaigns that become critical educational moments. The case studies presented here uncover an evolutionary process of learning, leading to strategic deterrence successes. Some terrorist organizations abandoned the use of force altogether, while others abandoned their aspirational goals or resorted to lower levels of violence. These findings should enable policymakers to transition from the failed policy that sought to

defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the unending war in Afghanistan to a policy that successfully applies deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of deterrence theory, terrorism studies, war and conflict studies, and security studies.

Libya and U. S. Efforts to Influence Rogue States University of Georgia Press

Cold War-era strategic thinking was driven by the belief that individuals, organizations, and foreign states could be deterred from offensive action by the threat of reprisal. That assurance was shaken with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; suddenly, it seemed that no threat was powerful enough to deter individuals or organizations that valued political objectives over their own lives and the lives of their members. More than a decade later, new research and theory are bringing deterrence back into currency as a viable counterterrorism strategy. Alex S. Wilner updates deterrence theory for conflict in the twenty-first century, arguing for its value against challengers such as rogue states, cyber warriors, and transnational terrorist organizations. *Deterring Rational Fanatics* provides a full-scale discussion of deterrence theory concepts and controversies, assessing the utility of relying on the logic of deterrence and coercion to counter contemporary terrorism. In particular, targeted killings directed against the Taliban of Afghanistan provide a vivid illustration of the impact deterrence can have on militant behavior: precision strikes that eliminate militant leaders represent a significant cost to planning and participating in political violence, a cost that can coerce, manipulate, and alter behavior. Though deterrence theory is not a panacea for terrorism, insurgency,

or militancy, it can serve as a strategic guide for state responses; as Wilner shows, terrorist violence can indeed be deterred.

The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Second Edition Springer

The basis of nuclear doctrine during the cold war was deterrence. Nuclear powers were deterred from attacking each other by the fear of retaliation. Today, much of the concern over possible nuclear attack comes in the context of rogue states and terrorism. And since only states are known to possess nuclear weapons, an important question is how to deter them from letting terrorists acquire a device, whether through an authorized transfer or a security breach. Michael A. Levi analyzes this aspect of deterrence in the post-cold war world, as well as what to do if deterrence breaks down. He suggests how to discourage states from giving weapons or nuclear materials to terrorists and how to encourage states to bolster security against any accidental transfer. He also challenges the assumption, implicit in most discussion, that developing a technical ability to attribute nuclear attacks will automatically yield "deterrence" against state sponsorship. In doing that, the report moves the policy debate from its current focus on technology to one that is equally about strategy and thus offers thoughtful analysis and practical guidelines for U.S. policy on a complex and important issue.

[Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons](#) Oxford University Press

Nuclear Logics examines why some states seek nuclear weapons while others renounce them. Looking closely at nine cases in East Asia and the Middle East, Etel Solingen finds two distinct regional patterns. In East Asia, the norm

since the late 1960s has been to forswear nuclear weapons, and North Korea, which makes no secret of its nuclear ambitions, is the anomaly. In the Middle East the opposite is the case, with Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Libya suspected of pursuing nuclear-weapons capabilities, with Egypt as the anomaly in recent decades. Identifying the domestic conditions underlying these divergent paths, Solingen argues that there are clear differences between states whose leaders advocate integration in the global economy and those that reject it. Among the former are countries like South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, whose leaders have had stronger incentives to avoid the political, economic, and other costs of acquiring nuclear weapons. The latter, as in most cases in the Middle East, have had stronger incentives to exploit nuclear weapons as tools in nationalist platforms geared to helping their leaders survive in power. Solingen complements her bold argument with other logics explaining nuclear behavior, including security dilemmas, international norms and institutions, and the role of democracy and authoritarianism. Her account charts the most important frontier in understanding nuclear proliferation: grasping the relationship between internal and external political survival. Nuclear Logics is a pioneering book that is certain to provide an invaluable resource for researchers, teachers, and practitioners while reframing the policy debate surrounding nonproliferation.

Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence Routledge

With many scholars and analysts questioning the relevance of deterrence as a valid strategic concept, this volume moves beyond Cold War nuclear deterrence to show the many ways in

which deterrence is applicable to contemporary security. It examines the possibility of applying deterrence theory and practice to space, to cyberspace, and against non-state actors. It also examines the role of nuclear deterrence in the twenty-first century and reaches surprising conclusions.

US National Security Policy after 9/11
Routledge

This book explores a range of biohealth and biosecurity threats, places them in context, and offers responses and solutions from global and local, networked and pyramidal, as well as specialized and interdisciplinary perspectives.

Nuclear Weapons and Strategy

Palgrave Macmillan

This study expounds upon the composition, dynamics, and consequences of the post-9/11 global security context by posing the following overarching research question: how has the event of 9/11 further enabled the US to legitimately articulate, disseminate, and implement an absolutist security agenda (ASA) on the world stage?

Security in the 21st Century: US and European Responses to Global Terrorism
Oxford University Press

In a vitally important book for anyone interested in nuclear proliferation, defense strategy, or international security, Matthew Kroenig points out that nearly every country with a nuclear weapons arsenal received substantial help at some point from a more advanced nuclear state. Why do some countries help others to develop nuclear weapons? Many analysts assume that nuclear transfers are driven by economic considerations. States in dire economic need, they suggest, export sensitive nuclear materials and technology—and ignore the security risk—in a desperate

search for hard currency. Kroenig challenges this conventional wisdom. He finds that state decisions to provide sensitive nuclear assistance are the result of a coherent, strategic logic. The spread of nuclear weapons threatens powerful states more than it threatens weak states, and these differential effects of nuclear proliferation encourage countries to provide sensitive nuclear assistance under certain strategic conditions. Countries are more likely to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology when it would have the effect of constraining an enemy and less likely to do so when it would threaten themselves. In *Exporting the Bomb*, Kroenig examines the most important historical cases, including France's nuclear assistance to Israel in the 1950s and 1960s; the Soviet Union's sensitive transfers to China from 1958 to 1960; China's nuclear aid to Pakistan in the 1980s; and Pakistan's recent technology transfers, with the help of "rogue" scientist A. Q. Khan, from 1987 to 2002. Understanding why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance not only adds to our knowledge of international politics but also aids in international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.

Strategic Nuclear Arms Control from Truman to Obama Council Special Report
Master's Thesis from the year 2004 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict Studies, Security, grade: 2 (B), University of Kent (Brussels School of International Studies), 64 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: Although the world stood united behind America when the dust of the collapsed twin towers of the World Trade Centre settled, differences between the United States and Europe soon became

apparent. Europe might have supported the US in Afghanistan, both politically and militarily, but diverging interests already became apparent when the US sidelined NATO and preferred to lead 'Operation Enduring Freedom' itself. The dispute escalated over the US plans to continue the war on terror in Iraq. Here, it emerged that the US and Europe do not share the same world view. While the US seem to perceive the world in Hobbesian terms, and believe that military strength is the only means to achieve security, Europe appears to understand security in the Kantian sense and believes that 'perpetual peace' can be achieved. The question that divided Europe and the US over Iraq then is more than a simple difference of opinion but reflects a deep philosophical division: Can global security be achieved by force or through sustained dedication to a set of normative principles implemented by the world community? Consequently, the counterterrorism strategies formulated in Europe and the US are of a fundamentally different nature, which cannot be explained merely by the discrepancy in military capabilities. If that would be the case, Europe would have begun to build up its military potential by now. Acknowledging that "terrorism has become one of the most pressing political problems," (David Whittaker) the aim of this paper is to compare the US and the European approach to global terrorism, establish reasons for the differences and evaluate which approach might be more effective. As September 11, has changed our perception of secur

Intra-State Conflict, Governments and Security Edinburgh University Press

This new study challenges the widely held view that many current US adversaries cannot be deterred,

maintaining that deterrence is not a relic of the Cold War period and that it should shape US policies toward so-called 'rogue states' and terror groups. James Lebovic argues that deterrence principles continue to apply, and focuses upon the 'three pillars' of the Bush administration's national security policy: missile defence, which preoccupied the administration until September 11, 2001 pre-emption, which became the US focus with the September 11 attacks and US success in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan homeland security, which the administration has portrayed as more a natural response to threat than an aspect of policy that must be reconciled with the other pillars. Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States asserts that bad offences and defences have been endemic to the current US policy approach, leading US policy makers to pursue policies that require them to do everything without adequate concern for resource trade-offs, overreach, and unintended consequences. This book will be of great interest to students of US foreign policy, national and international security, terrorism and international relations in general.

Strategy in the Global Age National Academies Press

In the wake of the September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States, the U.S. Government declared a global war on terrorism (GWOT). The nature and parameters of that war, however, remain frustratingly unclear. The administration has postulated a multiplicity of enemies, including rogue states; weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators; terrorist organizations of global, regional, and national scope; and terrorism itself. It also seems to have conflated them into

a monolithic threat, and in so doing has subordinated strategic clarity to the moral clarity it strives for in foreign policy and may have set the United States on a course of open-ended and gratuitous conflict with states and nonstate entities that pose no serious threat to the United States. Of particular concern has been the conflation of al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's Iraq as a single, undifferentiated terrorist threat. This was a strategic error of the first order because it ignored critical differences between the two in character, threat level, and susceptibility to U.S. deterrence and military action. The result has been an unnecessary preventive war of choice against a deterred Iraq that has created a new front in the Middle East for Islamic terrorism and diverted attention and resources away from securing the American homeland against further assault by an undeterrable al-Qaeda. The war against Iraq was not integral to the GWOT, but rather a detour from it. Additionally, most of the GWOT's declared objectives, which include the destruction of al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations, the transformation of Iraq into a prosperous, stable democracy, the democratization of the rest of the autocratic Middle East, the eradication of terrorism as a means of irregular warfare, and the (forcible, if necessary) termination of WMD proliferation to real and potential enemies worldwide, are unrealistic and condemn the United States to a hopeless quest for absolute security. As such, the GWOT's goals are also politically, fiscally, and militarily unsustainable. Accordingly, the GWOT must be recalibrated to conform to concrete U.S. security interests and the limits of American power. The specific measures required

include deconflation of the threat; substitution of credible deterrence for preventive war as the primary vehicle for dealing with rogue states seeking WMD; refocus of the GWOT first and foremost on al-Qaeda, its allies, and homeland security; preparation to settle in Iraq for stability over democracy (if the choice is forced upon us) and for international rather than U.S. responsibility for Iraq's future; and finally, a reassessment of U.S. military force levels, especially ground force levels. The GWOT as it has so far been defined and conducted is strategically unfocused, promises much more than it can deliver, and threatens to dissipate scarce U.S. military and other means over too many ends. It violates the fundamental strategic principles of discrimination and concentration.

Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States US National Security Policy after 9/11

The complexity of the twenty-first century threat landscape contrasts markedly with the bilateral nuclear bargaining context envisioned by classical deterrence theory. Nuclear and conventional arsenals continue to develop alongside anti-satellite programs, autonomous robotics or drones, cyber operations, biotechnology, and other innovations barely imagined in the early nuclear age. The concept of cross-domain deterrence (CDD) emerged near the end of the George W. Bush administration as policymakers and commanders confronted emerging threats to vital military systems in space and cyberspace. The Pentagon now recognizes five operational environments or so-called domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace), and CDD poses serious problems in

practice. In *Cross-Domain Deterrence*, Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay assess the theoretical relevance of CDD for the field of International Relations. As a general concept, CDD posits that how actors choose to deter affects the quality of the deterrence they achieve.

Contributors to this volume include senior and junior scholars and national security practitioners. Their chapters probe the analytical utility of CDD by examining how differences across, and combinations of, different military and non-military instruments can affect choices and outcomes in coercive policy in historical and contemporary cases.

Deterring America Council on Foreign Relations

The United States national-security establishment is vast, yet the United States has failed to meet its initial objectives in almost every one of its major, post-World War II conflicts. Of these troubled efforts, the US wars in Vietnam (1965-73), Iraq (2003-11), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and miscalculated decisions. Because overarching policy goals are distant and open to interpretation, policymakers ground their decisions in the immediate world of short-term objectives, salient tasks, policy constraints, and fixed time schedules. As a consequence, they exaggerate the benefits of their preferred policies, ignore the accompanying costs and requirements, and underappreciate the benefits of alternatives. In *Planning to Fail*, James H. Lebovic argues that a profound myopia helps explain US decision-making

failures. In each of the wars explored in this book, he identifies four stages of intervention. First and foremost, policymakers chose unwisely to go to war. After the fighting began, they inadvisably sought to extend or expand the mission. Next, they pursued the mission, in abbreviated form, to suboptimal effect. Finally, they adapted the mission to exit from the conflict. Lebovic argues that US leaders were effectively planning to fail whatever their hopes and thoughts were at the time the intervention began. Decision-makers struggled less than they should have, even when conditions allowed for good choices. Then, when conditions on the ground left them with only bad choices, they struggled furiously and more than could ever matter. Policymakers allowed these wars to sap available capabilities, push US forces to the breaking point, and exhaust public support. They finally settled for terms of departure that they (or their predecessors) would have rejected at the start of these conflicts. Offering a far-ranging and detailed analysis, this book identifies an unmistakable pattern of failure and highlights lessons we can learn from it.

Behavioral Economics and Nuclear Weapons Taylor & Francis

This volume moves beyond Cold War deterrence theory to show the many ways in which deterrence is applicable to contemporary security: in space, in cyberspace, and against non-state actors. It also examines the role of nuclear deterrence in the twenty-first century and reaches surprising conclusions.

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